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Abstract
During the global ﬁnancial crisis 2007–2009 ﬁscal policy was widely used as a stabilization
tool. Policymakers allowed a large build-up of public debt resulting from both automatic and
discretionaryexpansionarymeasures. At the same time, calls for policycoordinationstressed that
international spillovers of ﬁscal policy might be sizeable. We reconsider the case for ﬁscal coor-
dination by providing new evidence on the cross-border effects of discretionary ﬁscal measures.
We rely on a vector autoregression model as well as on a quantitative business cycle model. We
ﬁnd that i) large spillover effects cannot be ruled out and, in contrast to conventional wisdom,
ii) ﬁnancial factors rather than trade ﬂows lie at the heart of the international transmission mech-
anism. We discuss the implications of these results for policy coordination when markets price
sovereign default risk, and put pressure on governments for implementing budget consolidation
measures.
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In response to the global ﬁnancial crisis, ﬁscal policy has been intensively used as a stabilization tool
throughout the globe. In spite of academic contributions raising issues regarding the effectiveness of
ﬁscal policy (see, for instance, Cogan et al. (2010) or Uhlig (2010)), there seems to be little doubt
among policymakers that multipliers are quite sizeable. Even stronger appears to be the belief, shared
in policy circles, that ﬁscal policy measures in a country are likely to have sizeable international spill-
over effects. At least, such a notion seems to have motivated calls for joint ﬁscal efforts in the context
of the global ﬁnancial crisis, at ﬁrst to provide global ﬁscal stimulus to a failing global demand, then
to stress the need for a moderation and delay of debt and deﬁcit consolidation measures, especially
among large countries with spare ﬁscal capacity.1
Yet, to date, the evidence on the size of international spillovers arising from ﬁscal measures taken at
the national level is in short supply.2 Moreover, quantitative exercises based on standard models typ-
ically predict that cross-border effects are quite contained (see Cwik and Wieland 2010 and Corsetti
etal. 2010c). Againstthis background,the presentpaperpursuestwo objectives. In the ﬁrstpart ofthe
paper, after brieﬂy reviewing the ﬁscal response to the crisis, we reconsider cross-border spillovers of
ﬁscal policy within a vector autoregression (VAR) framework, as well as within a standard business
cycle model. In the second part, we discuss the implications for policy cooperation in an international
context characterized by high public debt and vulnerability to ﬁscal crises.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the US as the base country by virtue of their size and role in the
world economy, as well as for reasons of data availability. Building on time-series studies on the
effects of government spending shocks,we analyze the transmission of ﬁscal policy innovations orig-
inating in the US on economic activity abroad. We estimate a VAR model on quarterly time-series
data for the period 1980–2007. In light of the current debate on the identiﬁcation of exogenous
shocks to government spending in time-series models, we actually adopt two different identiﬁcation
schemes. The ﬁrst identiﬁcation scheme, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), posits that govern-
ment spending is predetermined relative to the other variables in the VAR. The second scheme, which
follows Ramey (2011), identiﬁes spending shocks by using forecast errors computed on the basis of
the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Our main results – robust across identiﬁcation schemes – are as follows. Focusing on the euro area
1“Our highest priority in Toronto must be to safeguard and strengthen the recovery... We worked exceptionally hard
to restore growth; we cannot let it falter or lose strength now. This means that we should reafﬁrm our unity of purpose
to provide the policy support necessary to keep economic growth strong.” (US President Obama in a letter to the G20
meeting in June 2010). On the occasion the EU called for unity in retrenchment: “Even though the timing, sequencing and
scope of exit measures have to be tailored to conditions prevailing in the individual G20 members, coordination between
governments can help to take into account possible spill-over effects.” (EU letter to G20)
2In an early contribution, Canzoneri et al. (2003) study the effects of US ﬁscal expansions on selected European coun-
tries. Beetsma et al. (2006) provide estimates for spill-over effects within Europe.
2(EA) and the UK as trading partners, our estimates suggest that an increase in US government spend-
ing by one percent of US GDP raises output by about 0.5 percent in the EA and 1 percent in the UK.
These peak effects occur after about 2 years. In addition, we ﬁnd that the dollar depreciates strongly
in real terms against the currencies of both trading partners. Importantly, we also ﬁnd the response of
trade ﬂows quite moderate, such that it fails to provide a rationale for sizeable output spillovers.
We therefore attempt to interpret these ﬁndings through the lens of a standard two-country business
cycle model. Each country is assumed to specialize in the production of a speciﬁc set of intermediate
goods which are consumed by private households and the government. In the model, while house-
holds act so as to maximize their welfare subject to constraints on prices and wage setting, monetary
and ﬁscal policy are characterized by feedback rules. The speciﬁcation of the monetary rule is a stan-
dard Taylor-type rule. As regards ﬁscal policy, motivated by the results from our VAR and previous
work of ours (see Corsetti et al. (2011c)), we model a budget rule allowing for a systematic response
of taxes and government spending to public debt. As a result, an exogenous, debt-ﬁnanced increase
in government spending implies a spending reversal after some time, that is, a decline of government
spending below trend after the initial increase.
Using model simulations, we ﬁnd that the model does not have an easy time to generate spillover
effects of governmentspendingshockson foreign output which come closeto the magnitudesimplied
by the point estimates obtained from the VAR. Qualitatively, the model predictions align well with
the evidence only when we allow for spending reversals (suggested by the empirical evidence). Only
in this case, we ﬁnd a depreciation of the real exchangerate and a gradual build-up of foreign activity,
in line with our VAR results.
We arguethat this resultillustrates mostclearly the importanceofaccountingfor a “ﬁnancialchannel”
in theinternationaltransmissionmechanism. Speciﬁcally,whathappensinthemodeleconomyisthat,
given the monetary and ﬁscal feedback rules in place, an increase in domestic government spending
triggers expectations of a future spending reversal and reduced real interest rates in the medium
run. Expectations of lower future real rates reduce, all else equal, current long term real rates in
both countries. It is through this ﬁnancial channel that expectations of future ﬁscal and monetary
policies impact on current private expenditure both in the domestic economy and – transmitted via
international asset prices – in the foreign economy.
In the second part we discuss the implications of our ﬁndings – that is, the presence of large cross-
border spillovers as well as the importance of the ﬁnancial channel – for policy cooperation in an
international context. Speciﬁcally, in the light of the deterioration of the ﬁscal outlook in developed
countries documentedin section2, we discussthe challengesto stabilization policy in an environment
of high public debt and vulnerability to ﬁscal crises, as reﬂected by large and volatile risk premia
charged on sovereign bonds. To address this issue properly, the conventional model underlying calls
3for cooperation needs to be amended, so as to account for the effect of sovereign risk on private
borrowing costs. In related work, we have shown that this effect deﬁnes a distinct and powerful
channel of transmission, the sovereign risk channel (see Corsetti et al. 2011a). This effect raises the
vulnerability of the global economy to a downturn driven by self-fulﬁlling expectations in countries
with a deteriorated ﬁscal outlook, and without room for further monetary stimulus. While a full-
ﬂedgeinternational modelaccountingfor the sovereignrisk channelis not yet available,we argue that
the tangible threat to global recovery created by sovereign risk arguably lends support to coordinated
ﬁscalinitiatives. Suchinitiatives would need to combine gradualismin budgetcorrection by countries
with some ﬁscal space with decisive and credible debt consolidation measures in countries facing
market pressures.
2 The ﬁscal response to the crisis
In this section we brieﬂy review the adjustment of ﬁscal policies during and in the wake of the global
ﬁnancial crisis. While global in nature, the crisis impacted countries and/or regions differently, possi-
bly also as a result of different policy responses. Figure 1 displays annual output growth for the world
economy, for a sample of advanced economies and a sample of emerging and developing economies
(IMF classiﬁcation).3 The global ﬁnancial crisis which, according to the common narrative, started
in 2007 in the US sub-prime housing market, made itself felt in terms of economic activity in 2008:
output growth declined sharply and turned negative for the world economy in 2009. In fact, output
growth declined sharply in both country groups under consideration and by a similar amount in terms
of percentage points. Yet as output growth was lower in the advanced countries group during the
pre-crisis period, actual output declined substantially only in this group.
The US and the EA were among the regions hardest hit by the crisis; this has dramatic implications
for policy-making. Figure 2 illustrates this point by displaying measures of unemployment and the
short-term interest rates in both the EA and the US for the period 2005–2011. Although the rise of
unemployment masks dramatic differences within the EA, the aggregate picture resembles the de-
velopments in the US rather closely (the increase is larger in the US, however). Monetary policy
responded to the crisis by lowering interest rates, quickly running into the zero lower bound prob-
lem, and by adopting unconventional measures (on the latter, see for instance Meier 2009). Yet the
effectiveness of these measures remains an issue of controversy to date (see, e.g., Del Negro et al.
(2010) for a positive assessment) and the signiﬁcant uncertainty about the way they transmit to the
economy has probably constrained central banks in relying on such measures. Overall, the capacity
of monetary policy to stabilize the economyin the aftermath of the global ﬁnancialcrisis has arguably
3According to the IMF classiﬁcation, there are 34 countries within the advanced economies group and 150 countries
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Figure 1: Annual GDP growth (in percentage points) 1992–2011 in world and regions. Source: IMF.
been limited.
With the decline in activity, budget deﬁcits soared as a result of revenue losses, and increases of
government spending with the objective of providing stimulus to the economy and support to the
ﬁnancial sector. In ﬁgure 3 we plot general government debt in 2010 as a percentage of GDP for a
sample of OECD countries. The ﬁgure highlights the sharp increase during the period 2007–2010,
reﬂecting the cumulative effect of government budget deﬁcits in the years 2008, 2009, and 2010.
While the recent rise in debt is dramatic, it is not unprecedented. Taking a historical perspective,
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) show that public ﬁnances frequently deteriorate on a similar scale in the
wake of a ﬁnancial crisis – with an average increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio of 80 percent in the
three years following the crisis.
In order to take up the issue of coordinated policy actions, it is of particular interest to identify the
discretionary component in the ﬁscal response to the crisis, a task which in turn requires an estimate
of the automatic adjustment of the government budget. According to standard practice, we focus
on the cyclically-adjusted government budget balances, deﬁned as the government budget balance
which would prevail if output were at its natural level. Based on OCED data, we compute a simple
measure of the discretionary ﬁscal response to the crisis: the decrease in the cyclically adjusted













Figure 2: Unemployment and short-term interest rates 2005M1–2011M7 (in percentage points) in EA
and US. Sources: Bundesbank, St. Louis Fed and ECB.
crisis level in 2007.4 In principle, the sum of these changes should account for deliberate policy
measures taken on top of the automatic budget adjustment to the economic downturn. It thus captures
discretionary stimulus measures such as temporary increases in government spending or tax cuts
which have been traditionally considered instruments of stabilization policy. They were also used
during the crisis with a view to support economic activity. The most widely discussed measures
include the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act legislated in January 2009 and the European
Economic Recovery Plan introduced in the EU in November 2008.
In addition to these “conventional” discretionary ﬁscal measures, several governments provided sub-
stantial support to the ﬁnancialsector. Such measuresinclude lending and recapitalization operations,
as well as asset purchases at market prices. To the extent that these transactions do not necessarily
involve capital losses, they raise gross debt, but not net debt. To get a sense of the magnitudes of
these “unconventional” discretionary ﬁscal measures, we thus compute the difference between the
4See Girouard and Andr´ e (2005). The data are constructed on the basis of a disaggregated approach, computing the
response of different budget items to the cycle. The approach distinguishes four sources of tax revenues: personal in-
come taxes, social security contributions, corporate income and indirect taxes; in addition the estimates take into account
unemployment-related transfers. For all ﬁve categories, the output elasticity is decomposed into i) the tax-base elasticity
of a particular revenue/expenditure type and ii) the output elasticity of the tax/expenditure base in question. These compo-














Figure 3: General government gross ﬁnancial liabilities as of 2010 (percent of GDP). Source: OECD.
increase in gross and net debt. Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the cumulative CAPB
decrease and the difference in the increase between gross and net government debt for a sample of
OECD countries. It also shows that remaining increase in gross debt, which is unaccounted for by
our measures for discretionary ﬁscal policy. It provides a measure for the automatic deterioration of
public ﬁnancesduring the crisis (which, in turn, captures the decline in revenues,lower output growth
and possibly higher interest rates). According to this breakdown, there is substantial cross-country
variation in the ﬁscal response to the crisis.5
The measure of the conventional discretionary ﬁscal response to the crisis introduced above is ad-
mittedly crude. In some dimensions, it is likely to overstate the role of discretion. For instance,
the budget balances of numerous countries took a beating beyond what can be accounted for by the
decline in economic activity, because of the extraordinary declines in tax revenues driven by falling
asset prices and ﬁnancial sector proﬁts (see, e.g., Horton et al. 2009). In this respect, the OECD’s
measure of the cyclically adjusted primary balance is likely to pick up an exceptional decline in the
governmentbudget balance which is not entirely due to discretionary policy action. Nevertheless,our
measure should provide some idea of the importance of various ﬁscal measures for the increase of
5Benetrix and Lane (2010) also document substantial heterogeneity in ﬁscal outcomes in a systematic cross-country
analysis of the ﬁscal stance during the crisis. In particular, they ﬁnd that differences cannot be fully explained by differences
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Figure 4: Increase of gross general government debt 2007–2010 (percent of GDP): cumulative decline
of CPAB, gross-net debt increase, and remaining increase. Source: OECD and authors’ calculations.
Note: cumulative CAPB decline is the sum of change in cyclically adjusted primary balance (as
reported by OECD) in each year 2008, 2009 and 2010 relative to pre-crisis level in 2007.)
government-debt levels.
Indeed, a similar picture emerges from IMF estimates of the size of narrowly deﬁned discretionary
stimulus measures, reproduced in the left panel of Table 1. These estimates are based on an in-depth
analysis of national budget documents and medium-term ﬁscal plans in selected countries. Again, the
concerted effort around the globe to provide support to economic activity through discretionary ﬁscal
measures is apparent from the Table, despite sizeable differences across countries. The right panel
of Table 1 reproduces estimates of the support to the ﬁnancial sector. While sizeable, these measures
have not necessarily been recorded in the budget.
In spite of the difﬁculties in estimating automatic and discretionary measures, there is a sense in
which a sizeable ﬁscal response to the crisis has been deliberate in most advanced countries. Facing
rapidly falling output, governments have been intentionally refraining from undertaking any action
to compensate for the automatic increase in their budget deﬁcit in response to the fall in economic
activity and asset prices. On the contrary, they have resorted to discretionary expansionary measures,
and provided generous (contingent) support to the ﬁnancial sector. Public debt, risen markedly over
the period 2007-2010, is likely to persist at the new high level for many years, as far as advanced
8Table 1: Discretionary ﬁscal measures
Crisis-related stimulus Financial sector support
2009 2010 2011 up to 2010
China 3.1 2.7 ... ...
Italy 0 0 0 ...
France 1.2 1.1 0.6 ...
Germany 1.7 2.2 1.7 10.8
Russia 4.5 5.3 4.7 ...
Saudi Arabia 5.4 4.2 1.6 ...
Spain ... ... ... 7.1
UK 1.6 0.0 0.0 7.1
US 1.8 2.9 1.7 5.2
Numbers are percent of GDP. Discretionary ﬁscal tightening not shown. “...” indicates
that there are no observations. Source: International Monetary Fund (2010) and Inter-
national Monetary Fund (2011) .
economies are concerned (see Figure 5).
Thelarge ﬁscalexpansionin the ﬁrstyearsofthecrisis occurredamongcallsfor coordinatedstimulus,
consistent with the notion of strong cross-border spillovers from ﬁscal policy. Whether or not global
stimulus was truly cooperative, that is, to what extent national policy makers actually internalize
international spillovers resulting from their measures, is difﬁcult to say. Nonetheless, it would be a
mistake not to recognize the coordinated convergence onto a policy model overruling prescriptions of
budget austerity often followed in previous crisis episodes at the national or regional level. More or
less explicitly, governments have recognized the mutual beneﬁts from sustaining aggregate demand
at the national and global levels, and also from engineering a massive transfer of risk from the private
to the public sector balance sheet.
Traditional arguments feeding skepticism on coordinated actions fall into three categories, question-
ing feasibility, sustainability and size of spillovers in turn. First, coordination is not viable because
decision and implementation lags cause coordinated measures to be taken at inappropriate times.
Second, the international community does not have effective instruments to ensure that coordinated
measures are diligently adopted by the national governments. Third, empirical and theoretical work
cast doubts on the size of international spillovers. More speciﬁcally, once governments keep their
house in order, that is, they implement optimal stabilization policy from an inward-looking perspec-
tive – the gains from further reﬁnement of these policies (internalizing cross-border spillovers) are
minuscule. The international community thus has much more to beneﬁt from disciplined stabilization
policy at the national level (see Corsetti et al. 2010a among others).
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Figure 5: General government gross debt (percent of GDP) in advanced economies and emerging and
developing economies, according to IMF classiﬁcation. Source: IMF.
recent debate. It is also implicit in concerns expressed by observers raising doubts on the rationale
of providing ﬁscal stimulus in the ﬁrst place (see Barro 2009 and Cogan et al. 2010 among others),
even at the national level. In what follows, we take up the same question but with a distinct focus
on cross-border spillovers, partly because this is where the disagreement in both policy and academic
circles is most apparent, and partly because the answer to this question appears to be a fundamental
prerequisite for any further analysis of policy coordination.
3 Cross-border effects of ﬁscal expansion
We draw on two distinct approaches to formally assess the importance of cross-border effects of
ﬁscal policy. In both instances we to explore the domestic and international repercussions of an
exogenouschange in governmentspending. This experiment is informative in identifying the speciﬁc
transmission channels through which ﬁscal policy measures impact on the (global) economy. In the
ﬁrstpart, werely onanestimatedvectorautoregression(VAR)modelto establishtime-series evidence
on the basis of minimum set of a priori assumptions. In the second part, we try to shed light on this
evidence using a standard business cycle model.
103.1 Time-Series Evidence
As a case study, our empirical analysis focuses on the international repercussions in both the euro
area (EA) and the UK, of an exogenous change in government spending in the US. As explained
below, focusing on the US as the base country allows us to compare results from conceptually distinct
identiﬁcation schemes(see also our discussion in Corsetti et al. (2011c)). In addition we shed light on
spillovers from the largest economy in the world, onto economies which differ substantially in their
relative size. In our study, we are speciﬁcally interested in studying the cross-border effects of a US
spending expansion on economic activity in the EA and the UK, as well as on the US bilateral trade
with these economies.
3.1.1 Identiﬁcation and speciﬁcation
During the last decade, a large number of studies have attempted to characterize the ﬁscal trans-
mission mechanism using VAR models, mainly in a closed economy context. Following Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), many of these studies identify ﬁscal shocks (as opposed to systematic policy re-
sponses to economic conditions) assuming that government spending is predetermined relative to the
other macro variables included in the VAR.6 This assumption appears plausible to the extent that
government spending does not include transfers, which vary automatically with the cycle, and that
decision lags prevent policy makers from responding instantaneously to the state of the economy.
Yet this approach to the identiﬁcation of government spending innovations is subject to the criticism
that changes in government spending, while unrelated to the state of the economy, may be partly
anticipated by economic agents – a point which has been forcefully made by Ramey (2011), among
others. In an alternative approach developed by this author, government spending shocks are identi-
ﬁed with forecast errors made by professional forecasters. The series of these errors is then included
asanadditionalvariablein theVARmodelandis orderedﬁrst.7 Its dynamiceffectsare thencomputed
on the basis of impulse response functions implied by a recursively estimated VAR model.
In the following we report results obtained under both identiﬁcation schemes. We estimate variants
of a VAR model on quarterly time series for the period 1980:1–2007:4, that is, we do not consider
the crisis period. Our VAR model includes four US time series: government spending and output
(in logs and real terms), a measure of long-term real interest rates (quarterly percentage points) and
public debt (scaled by quarterly GDP). To analyze the effects of US spending shocks, for either the
EA or the UK, we include the bilateral real exchange rate and, in order to economize on the degrees
of freedom, we rotate, as the last variable, bilateral exports, bilateral imports, bilateral trade balance,
6Under this assumption, innovations to government spending represent exogenous innovations in a recursively estimated
VAR model, with government spending ordered ﬁrst.
7Speciﬁcally, Ramey computes the forecast error of quarterly government spending growth on the basis of the survey of
professional forecasters maintained at the Philadelphia Fed.
11and foreign output, in turn. The VAR model also includes a constant and a linear time trend.
3.1.2 The transmission of spending shocks in the US economy
ThetransmissionofUSspendingshocksin the USeconomyaredisplayedin Figure6: the left column
(“VARinnovation”)refers to the Blanchard-Perottiidentiﬁcation scheme,the right column (“Forecast
error”) to the alternative identiﬁcation scheme due to Ramey (2011).8 In either column, the size of
the shock is normalized so that government spending increases by one percent of GDP on impact.
In these and all the graphs to follow, the solid lines display point estimates, while the shaded areas
indicate 90 percent conﬁdence bounds obtained by bootstrap sampling. The horizontal axis measures
quarters. Outputandgovernmentspendingare measuredin outputunits, sothatthe responseof output
provides a direct measure of the government spending multiplier. The long-term real interest rate is
measured in quarterly percentage points, while public debt is measured relative to quarterly GDP.
VAR innovations Forecast errors










































Figure 6: Effects of US government spending shock on US variables. Notes: the left column shows
results for Blanchard-Perotti identiﬁcation scheme, the right column shows results for forecast error
identiﬁcation scheme. The shock is normalized so that government spending increases by one percent
of GDP on impact. Horizontal axis measures quarters. Solid lines display point estimates, shaded ar-
eas indicate 90 percent conﬁdence bounds. Output and government spending are measured in percent
of trend output, long-term rate measures the long-term real interest rate in quarterly percentage points,
public debt is measured relative to quarterly GDP.
A Comparison of the graphs in the two columns shows that, while the responses are quantitatively
different, theirpatternis remarkablysimilar overall.9 Governmentspending,displayedinthe ﬁrstrow,
8In this ﬁgure we show results pertaining to US variables obtained from a VAR model which also includes the US-EA
exchange rate and EA output. We discuss results for these variables below.
9Ramey (2011) stresses a number of differences, notably in the responses of consumption and the real wage. We do not
12rises on impact, butits increaseis not persistent. Underboth identiﬁcation schemes,spendingactually
tends to undershootits long-run trend – this happenssomewhatearlier underthe identiﬁcation scheme
based on forecast errors (see Corsetti et al. 2011c). The response of output is positive on impact in
both cases. However, while output displays a hump-shaped adjustment path under the identiﬁcation
scheme based on VAR innovations, its response is more short-lived when we use forecast errors
to identify shocks. Regarding long-term real interest rates, we ﬁnd a decline in the medium term
following the shock. Finally, public debt rises strongly under both identiﬁcation schemes, although
the response is barely signiﬁcant under the forecast-error approach.
While output multipliers are non-negative, it is worth noting here that the effects are moderate and
short-lived. Hence, they are not suited to strengthen the case for extensive ﬁscal stimulus measures.
Yet this evidence reﬂects merely the average effect of ﬁscal policy for a sample in which the econ-
omy arguably operated close to full employment and ﬁnancial market were functioning reasonably
well. The effectiveness of ﬁscal policy, in contrast, may be quite different under other circumstances.
Elsewhere, indeed, we have shown that average linear estimates may hide strong differences across
economic environments (see Corsetti et al. 2011b).
3.1.3 External and cross-border effects
In Figure 7 we turn to our analysis of the external effects of US government spending. As already
mentioned, we compute the impulse responses in the ﬁgure, by rotating the bilateral variables, one at
a time, as the last variable in the VAR model – with the exception of the real exchange rate, which
is always included. The trade variables pertain to bilateral US variables and are measured in percent
of US trend output. Output in the EA and the UK is instead measured in percentage deviation from
trend.
The ﬁrst row in the ﬁgure shows the response of the bilateral real exchange rate, which depreciates
sharply and substantially, along a hump-shaped adjustment path. Although puzzling in light of the
received wisdom, similar results have been documented for the US real effective exchange rate by
Kim and Roubini (2008) and several subsequent studies.
The second and third rows display the dynamics of US exports and imports, respectively. Exports
hardly move on impact, and start to improve over time. Overall, the increase is moderate, reaching
a peak of about 0.15 and 0.05 percent of US trend output for the EA and UK as trading partner,
respectively. Import responses differ somewhat across identiﬁcation schemes, but movements in this
variable are quite contained and barely signiﬁcant. As a result, the US trade balance, especially
against the EA, moves quickly into surplus after the ﬁrst couple of quarters, as shown the forth row
of the ﬁgure. This ﬁnding is in line with earlier studies providing evidence at odds with the notion of
include these variables inour model. Corsetti et al. (2011c) provide amore detaileddiscussion of similaritiesand differences
across both identiﬁcation schemes.
13VAR innovations Forecast errors








































































































Figure 7: Effects of US government spending shock on bilateral trade with EA and UK and on EA
and UK output. Notes: see ﬁgure 6; except for EA and UK output (measured in percentage deviation
from trend), variables pertain to the US and are measured in bilateral terms in percent of US trend
output.
“twin deﬁcits” (see Kim and Roubini (2008), but also Corsetti and M¨ uller (2006) and Monacelli and
Perotti (2006) for different ﬁndings on the basis of alternative speciﬁcations and different samples).
Finally, the bottom row of Figure 7 displays the response of output in the EA and the UK. The point
estimate indicates a gradual, but sizable build-up, reaching at least 0.5 and 1 percent of EA and UK
14output, respectively. The response, however, is only marginally signiﬁcant.
Resultsaresimilar bothacrossidentiﬁcationschemesandacrosscountries(EAorUK).Atthe country
level, however, there are a few notable differences. The responses of exports and imports, as well as
of the trade balance, are smaller in the UK case (although the response of US imports from the UK is
positive on impact). UK output, in contrast, responds more strongly to the increase in US government
spending although its adjustment pattern is quite similar to that of EA output.
Overall, the external effects of US spending shocks appear to be non-negligible. Empirical ﬁndings
of substantial cross-border effects are not unusual. For instance, Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011)
estimate sizeable cross-border effects of ﬁscal policy within Europe: in response to an exogenous
increase in government spending in either France, Germany, Italy, Spain or the UK, the rest-of-EU
output increases by about 0.35 percent, after 3 years.10
VAR innovations Forecast errors















































Figure 8: Effects of US government spending shock on real exchange rates and foreign output. Notes:
see ﬁgure 6. Solid lines reproduce point estimates for baseline speciﬁcation. Dashed-dotted lines
(shaded areas) show point estimates (conﬁdence bonds) for VAR model where US government spend-
ing is expressed relative to government spending in the EA (top) and UK (bottom).
It is worth stressing that the estimated dynamic cross-border effects of ﬁscal policy may reﬂect possi-
ble reactions by foreign policies. For instance, if government spending in the UK and the EA rises in
responseto a positiveinnovationto USspending,the cross-borderdynamiceffectsshownin the ﬁgure
may simply reﬂect the endogenous expansionary policy in the foreign economies. Strictly speaking,
policy spillovers are deﬁned holding constant the policy instruments abroad.
10In an early VAR analysis, Canzoneri et al. (2003), employing a variant of the Blanchard-Perotti identiﬁcation scheme,
also ﬁnd a delayed, but sizeable increase in French, Italian and British output in response to US ﬁscal expansions. Beetsma
et al. (2006) combine a VAR model with an estimated trade equation for European countries, and ﬁnd sizeable output
spillovers from shocks to German and French government spending.
15As a way to verify the robustness of our results, we thus consider an alternative VAR model and
include US government spending in relative terms, that is, US spending relative to either UK or EA
government spending. Figure 8 show results for the key variables of interest, again for both identiﬁ-
cation schemes discussed above. The dashed line report the point estimates together with 90 percent
conﬁdence bounds (grey area); solid lines, in contrast, show the point estimates for the baseline case.
Results are quite similar to our baseline speciﬁcation, especially for the forecast-error speciﬁcation.
Cross-bordereffectsareslightly muted,however,for theBlanchard-Perottispeciﬁcation. Incidentally,
in the latter case, the puzzling depreciation of the real exchangerate vis-` a-vis the UK disappears over
the medium run.
In summary, the time-series evidence, subject to a number of important caveats common to time-
series studies on the ﬁscal transmission mechanism, we observe that our results lend some support to
the notion that ﬁscal policy has consequential spillovers across borders, a view often voiced in policy
circles. According to our point estimates, a US spending expansion of one percent of US output, can
raise GDP in the UK up to a full percentagepoint of UK output. This result is particularly remarkable,
given that the impact of the US expansion on US output is contained to start with. However, contrary
to the widespreadviewin policy circles, the transmission mechanismdoes notappearto work through
an international trade channel. US imports from the EA hardly move in response to a US spending
shock; imports from the UK only respond on impact. US exports actually rise over time, after a
deterioration on impact of exports to the UK. In the next section, we will resort to theory in order to
shed light on the underlying transmission channels.
3.2 A quantitative business cycle model
To gain insight on the international transmission of ﬁscal policy, we resort to a two-country business
cycle model. Since our goal is to provide a close up analysis of transmission, we abstract from
a number of economic features, which are not essential for our argument. In particular, we use a
simpliﬁed version of the model in Corsetti et al. (2011c), as we abstract from investment demand and
capital accumulation. As the basic features of the model are standard, we will keep the model outline
brief. Instead, we will highlight those equilibrium relationships which are pivotal to the international
transmission mechanism. We will also discuss to what extent and under which assumptions the
predictions of the model are qualitatively in line with the VAR evidence (including the evidence of a
limited role for the trade channel conventionally deﬁned). Quantitatively, however, we will show that
the spillover effects in the model turn out to be smaller than in the empirical analysis.
163.2.1 Model outline
The model we employ has become a standard work-horse in macroeconomics, providing the theo-
retical core to large policy models adopted by policy institutions. The model economy includes two
countries, referred to as H (Home) and F (Foreign), each producing a variety of country-speciﬁc
intermediate goods, with the number of intermediate good producers normalized to unity. A fraction
n of ﬁrms is located in Home, the remaining ﬁrms (n,1] is located in Foreign. Analogously, Home
accounts for a fraction n ∈ [0,1] of the global population. Intermediate goods are traded across bor-
ders, while ﬁnal goods, which are bundles of intermediate goods, are not. Households supply labor
services only within the country where they reside, but trade a complete set of state-contingent as-
sets internationally. The model allows for nominal rigidities. Prices of intermediate goods are sticky
in producer-currency terms. Likewise wages are also adjusted infrequently. Below, we focus our
exposition on Home. When necessary, we refer to foreign variables by means of an asterisk.
Households and ﬁrms Households supply differentiated labor services. Within each country, they
are indexed according to labor types on the unit interval as in Erceg et al. (2000). Households en-
gage in monopolistic competition, but their ability to set wages is restricted: in each period only
an exogenously determined fraction (1 − ξW) of households may adjust their wage. Differentiated











Letting Wt(h) denote the wage rate for labor services of type h, the unit cost of domestic labor















Households consume a bundle of intermediate goods, which are assembled in order to minimize


































17where σ measures the terms of trade elasticity of the relative demand for domestically produced
goods, and ω ∈ [0,1] provides a measure for home bias.11



























where At(j) and Bt(j) denote intermediate goods producedin H and F, respectively,and ǫ measures
the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods produced within the same country.
Letting P(j) denote the price of an intermediate good expressed in domestic currency and Et the
nominal exchange rate (the price of domestic currency in terms of foreign currency) we assume that






















(1 − (1 − n)ω)P1−σ














and Qt = PtEt/P∗
t measures the real exchange rate.











where β is the discount factor, ϑ is a constant determining labor supply in steady state, and ϕ is the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
We assume that households trade a complete set of state-contingent securities.12 Let Ξt+1(h) denote
the payoff in units of currency H in period t + 1 of the portfolio held by household h at the end of
period t. With ρt,t+1 denoting the stochastic discount factor, the budget constraint of the household
is given by
Wt(h)Ht(h) + RtKt(h) + Υt − Tt − Pt(Ct(h) + Xt(h)) = Et {ρt,t+1Ξt+1(h)} − Ξt(h), (11)
where Tt and Υt denote lump-sum taxes and proﬁts of intermediate good ﬁrms, respectively. Both
are levied/distributed equally across households.
11This speciﬁcation follows Sutherland (2005) and De Paoli (2009). With ω = 1, there is no home bias: if the relative
price of foreign and domestic goods is unity, the fraction of domestically produced goods which ends up in the consumption
bundle is equal to n, while imports account for a share of 1 − n. Importantly, consumption goods are identical across
countries in this case. A lower value of ω implies that the fraction of domestically produced goods in consumption goods
exceeds the share of domestic production in the world economy. If ω = 0, there is no trade in goods across countries.
12Assuming alternatively incomplete international ﬁnancial markets, allowing for trade in non-contingent debt only, has
little bearing on our results. Results are available on request.
18Under complete ﬁnancial markets, households fully insure against the idiosyncratic income risk that
results from their limited ability to adjust wages in each period. Households are, therefore, ho-
mogeneous with respect to consumption and asset holdings. By contrast, households are heteroge-
neous with respect to labor supply as a result of infrequent wage adjustments. Given the household’s
marginal utility of nominal income, Λt, a household that is allowed to reoptimize its wage sets ˜ Wt(h)











subject to the demand for its labor service (3).
Producers of differentiated intermediate goods engage in monopolistic competition. The production
function is given by Yt(j) = Ht(j), where Ht(j) denotes domestic labor services employed by ﬁrm
j ∈ [0,n] in period t. We assume that prices are set in the currency of the producer and that price
setting is constrained exogenously ` a la Calvo, so that in each period only a fraction of intermediate
good producers (1 − ξP) may adjust its price. When ﬁrm j has the opportunity, it sets ˜ Pt(j) to









˜ Pt(j) − Wt+s
i
(13)
subject to demand Y D
t (j).
Fiscal and monetary policy Government consumption is ﬁnanced either through lump-sum taxes,
Tt, or through the issuance of nominal debt, Dt, denominated in domestic currency. The period
budget constraint of the government reads as follows
Dt+1
1 + it
+ Tt = Dt + Gt, (14)
where (1 + it) is the gross return on a one-period nominally riskfree bond, which is equal to
1/Etρt,t+1; Gt denotes government spending which, under the baseline scenario, is a bundle iso-
morphic to private consumption, except that it falls only on domestically produced goods—reﬂecting
the observation that the import content in government spending is considerably lower than in private
spending (e.g. Corsetti and M¨ uller 2006).
Deﬁne DRt = Dt/Pt−1 as a measure for real beginning-of-period debt, and TRt = Tt/Pt as taxes
in real terms. Letting variables without time subscript refer to steady-state values, we specify the
following feedback rules
Gt = (1 − ρ)G + ρGt−1 − ψGDRt + εt, TRt = ψTDRt, (15)
19where εt represents an exogenous iid shock to government spending. The ψ-parameters, which we
posit to be non-negative throughout, capture a systematic feedback of public debt on government
spending (negative) and taxes (positive). We assume that either parameter is sufﬁciently large to en-
sure the non-explosiveness of public debt. For instance, if ψG = 0 we posit that taxes are raised
sufﬁciently strongly in response to higher outstanding debt. Note, however, that ψG = 0 implies Ri-
cardian equivalence, so the speciﬁc time path of taxes, for a given time path of government spending,
is irrelevant for the real allocation in the economy. This assumption is frequently made in analyses
of ﬁscal transmission; by relaxing the assumption and allowing for a feedback channel from debt
to government spending, we allow for richer and arguably more plausible dynamics of government
spending (see also Corsetti et al. (2011c)).
Finally, turning to monetary policy, we assume ﬂexible exchange rates and specify policymaking by
means of a forward-looking interest rate feedback rule:
ln(1 + it) = φΠΠAt+1, (16)
where ΠAt = PAt/PAt−1 measures domestic (producer price) inﬂation.
Equilibrium To carry out our analysis, we consider a linear approximation of the model’s equilib-
rium conditions around a deterministic steady state in which government debt and inﬂation are zero
and trade is balanced. Before turning to simulation results, it is useful to focus ﬁrst on the equilibrium
conditions which play a critical role in shaping the international transmission mechanism. Regarding
notation, for each variable we will use lower-case letters to denote deviations from steady state. Pri-







(it+k − πt+1+k) | {z }
≡rrt+k
, (17)
where πt measures CPI inﬂation. Equilibrium condition (17) ties the current level of consumption
demand (in terms of deviations from steady state) to the entire path of expected future short-term real
interest rates, rrt. By the expectations hypothesis, in turn, the latter is equivalent to the real rate of
return on a bond of inﬁnite duration (see, for example, Woodford 2003, p. 244), or the long-term real
interest rate for short.
As stressed in Corsetti et al. (2011c), movements in long-term interest rates are at the heart of the
transmission mechanism through which ﬁscal and monetary policy inﬂuence aggregate demand. An
obvious consideration is that long-term rates reﬂect more than the contemporaneous stance of these
policies, as they heavily depend on expectations about the future policy course. They “telescope”, so
20to speak, anticipated future policy changes into today’s ﬁnancial conditions. By way of example, if
households come to expect tight ﬁscal policy over the medium run, they anticipate correspondingly
lower future policy rates. All else equal, these translate into an upfront drop in long-term rates,
boosting current consumption. The opposite is true if households anticipate a combination of loose
ﬁscal and tight monetary policy to prevail in the future. This – essentially ﬁnancial – transmission
channel substantiates the classical claim that, while current ﬁscal retrenchment can be expected to be
contractionary, anticipations of future cuts are actually expansionary in the short run.
Moreover, it is easy to show that the exchange rate appreciation depends linearly on the Home-to-
Foreign differential in long-term real interest rate: this simply follows from combining Euler equa-
tions for bonds traded in domestic and foreign currency, and solving forward. In equilibrium, the
price for Home consumption rises relative to Foreign consumption – the exchange rate strengthens in
real terms – whenever long-term rates at home exceed those abroad (see Corsetti et al. 2011c).
To interpret our results below, it is instructive to rewrite the short-term real interest rate as follows
rrt = it − Etπt+1 = it − ((1 − (1 − n)ω)EtπA,t+1 + (1 − n)ωEtπB,t+1)







The ﬁrst equivalence follows from the fact that Home inﬂation has a domestic and an imported-
goods-prices component, which is in turn driven by movements in the exchange rate. The second
equivalence is a by-product of uncovered interest parity, stating that Home nominal rates are ap-
proximately identical (up to ﬁrst order) to Foreign nominal rates, plus the expected rate of currency
depreciation.
The above expression shows that (under uncovered interest parity and the law of one price for in-
termediate goods traded internationally) short-term real interest rates are a weighted average of the
difference between policy rates and domestic inﬂation, in the Home and the Foreign country. This
relationship highlights that monetary and ﬁscal policy in one country affect the short-term real inter-
est rate in the other country. The relative weight of foreign policy on domestic rates is determined
by (1 − n)ω, which reﬂects the average import share in consumption and thus the openness of the
economy.13
In summary, the long-term rate, in turn a function of current and anticipated future short rates, drives
the response of the private sector demand to temporary (ﬁscal) shocks. The equilibrium relationships
(17) and (18) constitute a ﬁnancial channel through which both domestic and foreign, current and
expected future monetary and ﬁscal policy impact on the long-term real interest rate. It affects both
the domestic andexternalcomponentsofdemand- interest andexchangerates interactin equilibrium,
13By virtue of the forward-looking nature of the consumption decision, the fact that both the uncovered interest parity and
the law of one price may fail in the short run is not a fundamental objection to this transmission channel. What ultimately
matters is whether both laws hold in the medium and long-run.
21depending, among other parameters, on intra-temporal and intertemporal elasticities of substitution.
3.2.2 Calibration
In order to solve the model numerically, we assign the following parameter values. A period in the
model corresponds to one quarter. Accordingly, we set β = 0.99. For the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply we assume a value of one-third by setting ϕ = 3; see Domeij and Flod´ en (2006) for recent
evidence. Given these assumptions, we set ϑ to ensure that agents spend on average one-third of their
time endowment working. The trade price elasticity σ is set equal to 0.5 in the baseline scenario,
a value well within the (admittedly wide) range considered in the recent macroeconomic literature;
see Corsetti et al. (2008) for further discussion. Regarding γ, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion,
we assume a value of 0.26, in line with the estimates of Amato and Laubach (2003), but somewhat
higher than the estimates by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). This implies neverthelessa fairly high
value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) of private expenditure, as we do not model
private investment explicitly. Nominal rigidities play a key role in the transmission of government
spending shocks. We assume that ξP = 0.66, implying an average price duration of three quarters—
within the range of values discussed, for example, by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). Regarding
wage rigidities we set ξW = 0.75 so that the average wage duration is four quarters. For monetary
policy we assume φπ = 1.5.
The steady-state output share of government spending is assumed to be 20 percent. The parameter
ρ is set to 0.9, capturing the persistence of government spending deviations from trend documented
by many VAR studies on US data. In our baseline scenario we set ψG = ψT = 0.02, implying a
systematic feedback from higher public debt to government spending and taxes. These parameter
values not only ensure debt-stabilizing ﬁscal policy over time, but also assign some role to spending
restraint. Speciﬁcally, an initial increase in government spending would be followed after some time
by a fall in spending below trend, in line with the VAR evidence.14
Finally, we consider two distinct trade scenarios which are meant to capture bilateral trade relation-
ships between the US and either the EA or the UK, respectively. In the ﬁrst one, the Foreign economy
is only slightly smaller than the Home economy: we set n = 0.57. Alternatively, we set n = 0.85.
In both cases, we set ω to target the import share of the foreign country, i.e., 19 and 28 percent, re-
spectively (this implies an import share in Home of 14 and 4 percent, respectively). Note that, under
these assumptions, spillovers will tend to be relatively large. An alternative approach would be to set
14Using annual observations to estimatespending and tax rules, Gal´ ı and Perotti (2003) report estimatesfor thecoefﬁcient
on debt ranging from -0.04 to 0.03 for government spending, and from 0 to 0.05 for taxes, in a panel of OECD members (no
breakdown by country provided). For the U.S., Bohn (1998) reports estimates for the response of the surplus to debt in a
range from 0.02 to 0.05. To see that our parameter choice ensures the solvency of the government, that is, that ﬁscal policy
is “passive” in the sense of Leeper (1991), consider a linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions around the steady
state: abstracting from autocorrelation of government spending and assuming an “active monetary policy”, debt stability
holds if 1 − ψG − ψT < β.




































































Figure 9: Effects of government spending shock in Home: baseline scenario (for given country size n,
ω is set to target import share of EA (19 percent) and UK (28 percent), see blue lines with circles and
red line with crosses, respectively). All variables pertain to Home (US) and are measured in output
units, except for Output∗. The real exchange rate is measured in percentage deviations from steady
state.
the import share in Home so as to account for EA and UK imports in the US (about 2 and 1 percent,
respectively). Under this approach, spillover effects would be virtually zero – although this possibly
understates the actual effect, as spillovers from the US to the EA or the UK are likely to be transmit-
ted also through third countries. However, below we will show that, for either set of assumptions,
the model will not be able to match the size of the cross-border output effects estimated in our VAR
analysis above.
3.2.3 Simulation results
Figure 9 shows results for the baseline speciﬁcations, displaying the impulse responses of selected
variables to an exogenous increase in government spending in Home. Time is measured on the hori-
zontal axis in quarters. The responses of quantities are measured in percent of domestic output – with
23the exception of foreign output, which is measured in percent of foreign output. The real exchange
rate is measured in percentage deviations from steady state. The lines with circles (blue) reﬂect re-
sults for the US-EA trade speciﬁcation (n = 57 and an import share in Foreign of 19 percent). Lines
with crosses reﬂect results for the US-UK trade speciﬁcation (n = 85 and an import share in Foreign
of 28 percent).
Government spending increases initially because of the shock, but then tends to undershoot its long-
run (steady-steady) state level appreciably between 10 and 30 quarters from the shock – the budget
adjustmentrule brings abouta “spendingreversal”. In responseto the shockthere is a sizeable,hump-
shaped build-up of Home public debt. Home output increases sizably, with an impact response above
unity. Home consumption, instead, shows a hump-shaped increase with a peak response of about 0.3
percent of output, after 8 quarters.
The real exchange rate depreciates on impact and stays below steady-state level for an extended pe-
riod. Quantitatively, however, this response is contained relative to the VAR results. Home exports
improve slightly in response to the innovation, but then move gradually into negative territory. Quan-
titatively, the responses are also quite moderate. Home imports, in turn, increase more sizably on
impact and return gradually to steady state. The Home trade balance moves into a deﬁcit for the ﬁrst
ten quarters, then improves after about 4 to 5 years. Trade balance movements are nonetheless small.
Finally, the impact Foreign output is positive on impact and rises further, reaching a peak after about
10 quarters.
A few results from these exercises stand out. The responses pertaining to domestic developments
in the Home country are virtually identical in both (US-EA or US-UK) speciﬁcations. There are
however differences in the response of trade variables. Home exports and imports, as well as the
trade balancetend to respondmore in the US-EAtrade scenario. Foreignoutput, in contrast,increases
more strongly in the US-UK scenario.
Overall, the predictions of the model are broadly in line with the VAR evidence, discussed above, at
least qualitatively. Nonetheless, international spillovers on foreign activity are small relative to the
point estimates from the VAR model, especially as far as peak responses are concerned. Also, the
pattern of the Home trade balance for the US-EA speciﬁcation of the model is quite distinct from
what we documented for the VAR model.
To shed further light on the mechanisms underlying these results, Figure 10 contrasts the responses
for the US-EA trade baseline speciﬁcation (blue lines with circles) with the responses obtained under
the assumption that government spending falls on both domestic and foreign goods (black lines with
diamonds) and under the assumption that the import share is 2 percent in Home (corresponding to the
average import share of imports from the EA, in terms of US GDP); and 2.6 percent in Foreign (red
line with crosses).
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Figure 10: Effects of a government spending shock in the Home country: baseline model with US-EA
trade scenario (blue lines with circles); alternative speciﬁcations with government spending falling
on both domestic and foreign goods (black lines with diamonds) and imports in Home account for 2
percent of GDP (red lines with crosses). Notes: see ﬁgure 9.








































































Figure 11: Effects of a government spending shock in the Home country: baseline speciﬁcation for
US-EA trade scenario (blue lines with circles); alternative speciﬁcation with σ = 1.5 (red lines with
crosses) and σ = 3 (black lines with diamonds). Notes: see ﬁgure 9.
Under these alternative assumptions, perhaps not surprisingly, trade variables respond quite differ-
ently, at least from a quantitative point of view. Consider ﬁrst the case of a low import share in
the Home country. In this case there is virtually no effect of a Home ﬁscal expansion on Home
trade variables, measured in terms of Home output. Foreign output also appears basically unaffected.
If, instead, the import share is left unchanged relative to the baseline scenario, but we assume that
government spending falls on goods produced in both the Home and the Foreign country, spill-over
effects are stronger. Notably, the impactresponsesof Home imports, the Home trade balanceand For-
eign output are much stronger than in the baseline scenario, reﬂecting the direct effect of increased
government spending in Home on goods produced abroad.
263.2.4 A close-up analysis of spillovers
As we are particularly interested in the mechanism underlying international spillovers, it is appropri-
ate to provide a detailed account on the adjustment process in the Foreign country, when the Home
governmentundertakesa ﬁscalexpansion. Under our baselinescenario,Figure 11 shows the response
of Foreignoutput,consumptionandtrade balance. Sinceour baselineassumesa relatively smallvalue
for the trade price elasticity, we also report responses assuming higher values for σ = {1.5,3}, dis-
played by the red lines with crosses and the black lines with diamonds, respectively.
The model’s predictions are sensitive to these alternative assumptions, especially as far as cross-
border effects are concerned. As the real exchange depreciates, demand shifts, all else equal, towards
goods produced in Home. This is reﬂected by rising Home exports. Such an effect is stronger, the
higherthe trade price elasticity. Forhigh valuesofthis elasticity, indeed,the increasein Home exports
dominatesthe increasein Home imports (which is drivenby the increasedlevelof Homeactivity), and
the Foreign trade balance moves into a deﬁcit. As a result, spillovers from the Home ﬁscal expansion
on Foreign output are also somewhat weaker relative to the baseline scenario.
Yet, these results qualify the widespread view that spillover effects operate exclusively or mostly
through the trade balance. As already discussed in relation to the expressions (17) and (18), the level
of private expenditure is tightly linked to long-term real rates, that is, it is pinned down by an asset
price. Since these rates reﬂect the entire path of current and anticipated future short-term real rates,
they are in turn driven by the dynamics of domestic (producer price) inﬂation in Home and Foreign
(affectedbyﬁscalvariables),andbythecorrespondingadjustmentofpolicyratesby thecentralbanks.
In our experiments, anticipations of spending reversals lead private agents to foresee a low domestic
inﬂation and, as the Home monetary stance is consistent with an interest rate feedback rule, a path
of low short-term real rates (see Corsetti et al. 2011c for a detailed discussion). This, all else equal,
drives down long-term real interest rates, suggesting that spending reversal cause (other things equal)
a short-run expansion in demand (the larger, the sooner the expected reversal is phased-in).
From the vantage point of the Foreign country, the dynamics of Home inﬂation and Home monetary
policy have a direct bearing on the domestic long-term real interest rate. It is through this ﬁnancial
channel, that domestic ﬁscal policies generate sizeable international spillover effects. In our experi-
ment, the Foreign long-term rate falls gradually over time, in anticipation of the approaching reversal
at Home. This drives the dynamic adjustment of Foreign consumption, which rises in a hump-shaped
manner in response to the Home ﬁscal expansion.
This is not to deny that openness and trade matter for the international transmission mechanism.
Depending on the trade price elasticity, the Foreign trade balance may improve or worsen in response
to a Home ﬁscal expansion, thus affecting the magnitude of the cross-border effects. But Foreign
output and consumption still rise, irrespectively of the sign of the trade balance response. Yet the
27degree of trade integration also matters for the strength of the ﬁnancial channel, as trade openness,
other things equal, magniﬁes the role of foreign policy rates for domestic real interest rates (a point
emphasizedbyouranalyticalderivationof(17)and(18)above). In ourbaselinescenario,forinstance,
the positive impact spillover on output raises Foreign inﬂation and thus the Foreign policy rate. Yet
consumption increases relative to steady state; this is in line with the anticipated spending reversals
in Home – reﬂected in declining Foreign long-term real interest rates.
3.2.5 The policy framework
So far we have discussed simulation results against the background of the VAR evidence, which
captures the average effect of government spending innovations over the entire sample period. We
have shown that the model predictions align well with the evidence along various dimensions and
identiﬁed dimensions in which the model fails quantitatively. In doing so, we have also identiﬁed
channels through which domestic ﬁscal policy measures are likely to spill over onto other countries.
Speciﬁcally, the hump-shaped increase of Foreign output in response to a Home ﬁscal expansion is
driven by the dynamics of long-term real interest rates.
In our baseline model, however, the speciﬁc dynamics of the long-term real rate – especially its
decline in response to a ﬁscal innovation – is the result of modeling a ﬁscal and monetary policy
mix which gives rise to spending reversals and a moderate response to inﬂation by the Central Bank,
according to a standard Taylor rule (see Corsetti et al. 2011c). In the following, we discuss further
the role of the policy framework.
To start with, Figure 12 displays the dynamic adjustment to a Home ﬁscal expansion in our baseline
scenario, and under an alternative scenario. For the latter we assume that government spending fol-
lows an exogenous AR(1) process, as is commonly posited in the literature (ψG = 0). Put differently,
we now abstract from a budget policy rule which relates public debt accumulation to both tax and
spending adjustment over time.
The difference in the results across the two speciﬁcations is quite stark. In the absence of a spend-
ing reversal, the Home real exchange rate appreciates and the Home long-term real rates rise (not
shown), causing Home consumption to decline (not shown). This leads to a fall in Home imports (not
shown), and (although Home exports also fall because of real appreciation), an improvement in the
Home trade balance. Relative to the baseline scenario, the medium-term policy mix at Home differs
considerably. This impacts – via the ﬁnancial transmission channel – on Foreign too. In particular,
Foreign consumption declines. This is consistent with a rise in the Foreign long-term rate reﬂecting
the current and future ﬁscal-monetary stance at Home in the absence of a spending reversal. Overall,
we note that absent a spending reversal, the model predictions are at odds with the VAR evidence
along various dimensions. Most importantly, the output spillovers are negative in this case.

















































Figure 12: Effects of government spending shock in Home: baseline scenario for trade with EA (blue
lines with circles) vs scenario without spending reversal (red lines with crosses). Notes: see ﬁgure 9.
It is important to emphasize that spending reversals exert a stimulating effect on global private ex-
penditure only to the extent that their effect on inﬂation is partly accommodated by the central bank.
What matters for ﬁscal transmission is that anticipated reversals induce expectations of lower real
rates in the future (in turn reﬂecting partial accommodation of their deﬂationary effects over time, by
virtue of the assumed Taylor rule). Via the expectations hypothesis, spending reversals then prevent
Home long-term real rates from rising on impact in response to the Home ﬁscal expansion.
A related, important aspect of the transmission mechanism is whether monetary policy is constrained
by the zero lower bond (ZLB) - a case which has gained renewed attention in the context of the
global ﬁnancial crisis 2007–09. Christiano et al. (2011) and Woodford (2011), among others, have
shown that the government spending multiplier is likely to be considerably larger in an economic
environmentwhere monetary policyis unableto maintain its interest target due to a binding constraint
on policy rates which prevents it from lowering rates. Under these conditions, monetary policy will
accommodate a ﬁscal expansion. Similarly, using a two-country model Bodenstein et al. (2010) show
that Home demand shocks (including to government spending) tend to have larger effects on Foreign
domestic output, if the Foreign central bank is constrained in adjusting domestic policy rates by the
ZLB.
Against this background,we also assess the extent to which a binding constraint on policy rates alters
our results on the international spillovers of ﬁscal policy shocks. To do so, we posit that policy rates
are ﬁxed, either in the Home country, or in both countries (and only later determined by the interest








































































Figure 13: Effects of a government spending shock in the Home country: the baseline US-EA trade
speciﬁcation (blue lines with circles) is compared with speciﬁcations in which the policy rate is ﬁxed
for 8 quarters in the Home country (red line with crosses) or in both countries (black lines with
diamonds). Notes: see ﬁgure 9.
30rate feedback rule). Figure 13 shows the results for two alternative speciﬁcations relative to our
baseline case (blue lines with circles). In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we assume that Home policy rates are
ﬁxed for 8 quarters (red lines with crosses). In the second speciﬁcation, rates are ﬁxed for 8 quarters
in both countries (black lines with diamonds).
For the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, relative to our baseline, we only observe a moderate increase in the effects
of a ﬁscal expansion on domestic output, and only a small increase in international output spillovers.
The effects of the constraint on the Home output response are limited here, because the reversal
already induces a sizeable output effect on impact, as explained above. Importantly, with a reversal,
Home policy rates fall relative to steady state before the constraint on the policy rate ceases to bind.
We should stress that, if we did not posit spending reversals ψG = 0, the Home output response
would more than double.
In our speciﬁcation with spending reversals, nonetheless, cross-border effects are sizeable when the
constraint on policy rates affects both economies (see also Bodenstein et al. 2010). The cross-border
effects are stronger here, because inﬂation dynamics would imply that the Foreign policy rate and
hence the real interest rate rises during the ﬁrst 8 quarters. With the constraint in place, instead,
foreign real rates decline, stimulating Foreign private expenditure and hence Foreign output. Interna-
tional effects on Foreign output resulting from a Home ﬁscal expansion are thus considerably larger
with a binding constraint on Foreign rates.
In conclusion, our analysis shows that standard theoretical models imply cross-border effects of na-
tional ﬁscal policy via a ﬁnancial channel, with long-term rates driving the level of private demand.
This channel encompassesthe trade and interest rate channels emphasized in the traditional literature
drawing on the Mundell-Fleming model. Importantly, however, these channels cannot be treated as
independent of each other. Also, the analysis emaphsizes that what ultimately matters for the trans-
mission of ﬁscal policy is the entire path of current and future mix of monetary and ﬁscal policy.
Hence, the assessment of spillovers from short-run stimulus or retrenchment measures cannot be dis-
joint from the dynamics of budget adjustment and monetary reaction markets expect to prevail in
response to them.
4 Lessons for cooperation
In the previous sections, we have provided time-series evidence suggesting large spillovers of ﬁscal
policy measures on foreign economic activity, to an extent that standard business cycle models have
a hard time to match. Yet, both the econometric evidence and our model analysis cast doubt on the
importance of the “trade channel” by which ﬁscal stimulus in one country is meant to raise activity
abroad via external demand. Instead, the transmission appears to operate via a “ﬁnancial channel”,
that is, through the impact of ﬁscal policy on the long-term real interest rate and, eventually, on
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future policy measures, both monetary and real, are as consequential for the level of current private
expenditures as current measures.
In this section, we further explore the working of a ﬁnancial channel of transmission, and the case for
cooperation, in an environment in which large ﬁscal imbalances raise issues regarding the ability of
governments to sustain their budget policies.
To start with, we should re-iterate that evidence for non-negligible cross-border spillovers is an es-
sential pre-requisite for international policy cooperation. Widespread beliefs that ﬁscal spillovers
are large arguably motivated repeated calls for coordinated ﬁscal expansions in the initial phase of
the crisis, with the objective to ensure a sufﬁciently high level of global demand vis-` a-vis a failing
economy. Our empirical evidence lends support to these beliefs.
It is worth emphasizing that, when calibrated to match the time-series evidence for the US, our the-
oretical model also backs the notion that the impact of current stimulus measures is magniﬁed by
expectations of systematic consolidation measures in the future. In our sample (ending in 2007),
indeed, we detect a speciﬁc pattern of stimulus associated with anticipated spending reversals: gov-
ernment spending falls below trend a few quarters after a positive shock. An open issue is whether
and to what extent the same pattern ﬁts the most recent expansions in response to the global ﬁnancial
crisis. One may observe that, in the ﬁrst phase of the crisis, emergency ﬁscal measures were rarely
accompanied by a clear indication of the future budget correction required to ensure a stable ﬁscal
outlook. Yet, it is hard to believethatprivate agentsfailed to anticipate the needfor budgetcorrections
via mix of spending cuts and tax increases at some point in the future, see Corsetti et al. (2010b) for
further discussion.
Calls for cooperative stimulus have become less frequent, and more selective and asymmetric as the
crisis evolved into a new stage, when, under the weight of the accumulated public liabilities, market
and political pressures to correct the ﬁscal trajectory intensiﬁed. Especially in Europe, starting in
2010, rising and volatile sovereign risk strengthened the case for immediate consolidation at a time
when most economies were not on a sound recovery path, and ﬁnancial markets remained fragile.
Late calls for cooperativestimulus measures havethus been directed towards surplus countries, point-
ing to the need for them to delay or reverse their consolidation plans, and use spare ﬁscal capacity
to counteract the negative impact on global demand of early consolidation measures by deﬁcit coun-
tries. Not surprisingly, these calls have been met with strong skepticism, backed by the following
counter-argument: with sharply rising sovereign risk spreads in several countries, no government can
consider its public ﬁnances beyond doubt; market turmoil justiﬁes an exceptionally high degree of
ﬁscal conservatism.
Onemaythusaskwhethertheendofthestimulusphaseeffectivelymarkstheendofﬁscalcooperation
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of ﬁscal coordination in the new phase of the policy response to the crisis is meaningful only to
the extent that it incorporates sovereign risk, and especially its implications for the international
transmission mechanism via the ﬁnancial channel. This is a promising area of ongoing research,
which (at the time of the writing) is still not fully developed. In what follows, we will provide some
insights relying extensively on related work of ours carried out with Andr´ e Meier and Keith Kuester.
4.1 Sovereign risk and macroeconomic instability
A key step towards understanding macroeconomic dynamics when ﬁscal authorities lack credibility
and markets price sovereign default risk consists of recognizing that rising interest rate spreads on
government borrowing spill over to the rest of the economy, that is, the borrowing conditions in the
private sector deteriorate. There is substantive evidence that sovereign and private sector spreads
move together, especially in countries that face ﬁscal strain. Not only such a pattern can be observed
for ﬁnancial institutions (which are directly or indirectly exposed to sovereign default via the com-
position of their portfolios) and for small (nonﬁnancial) ﬁrms that rely on local bank ﬁnancing. It
can also be documented for large international corporations with direct access to the bond markets,
which in principle should be able to insulate their ﬁnancing conditions from the country-speciﬁc
problems. In Corsetti et al. (2011a) we show that these sovereign-risk spillovers constitute a distinct
channel, that we dub the “sovereign-risk channel”, through which ﬁscal policy may have profound
consequences for macroeconomic stability.
Toappreciatehowthesovereignriskchannelworks,considerthepossibility thatprivatecreditspreads
rise with sovereign risk, because strained public ﬁnances imply a greater threat from taxation. In
Corsetti et al. (2011a), we formalize this idea by building on the model suggested by C´ urdia and
Woodford (2009), which allows us to consider the sovereign risk channel within a variant of the
canonical New Keynesian model. Speciﬁcally, for given monetary policy, aggregate demand falls
with an increase in sovereign risk as private borrowing costs increase.
As such, therefore, a sovereign risk channel tends to exacerbate the severity of recessions, especially
when these are large. To the extent that a slowdown in economic activity translates into a marked
deterioration of the budget deﬁcits, rising borrowing costs for the public and the private sector will
magnify the negative consequences of any given fundamental shock for aggregate demand and eco-
nomic activity. On the upside, one could of course point out that under these circumstances budget
corrections are likely to be less contractionary. In other words, the multiplier effects of spending cuts
are smaller, if these are associatedwith a reduction of the sovereign risk spread and thus in the private
borrowing costs.
However, according to our analysis, the overall response to ﬁscal policy measures is very sensitive to
33the strength of the spillover effect from public to private spreads and private expectations about the
prospective length of the recession. It turns out that, with policy rates at the zero lower bound, small
revisions in the anticipated duration of a recession, or small changes in the transmission of ﬁnancial
turmoil from the bond markets to banks and ultimately to borrowers, may fundamentally alter the
government spending multiplier, possibly even turning its sign.
Moreover, sovereign risk can become a severe source of macroeconomic instability. Suppose that
private expectations about the economy turn gloomier for some (non-fundamental) reason; ﬁrms and
households expect demand to fall. Holding interest rates ﬁxed, such expectations, in turn, imply
an upward revision of the projected government deﬁcit, as weaker economic activity leads to lower
tax revenue and primary surpluses. Investors thus immediately ask for a higher risk premium on
public debt. Via the sovereign-risk channel, however, the cost of private borrowing rises as well. The
logic comes full circle as higher credit costs slow down activity, validating the initial adverse shift in
expectations.
In tranquil times, this scenario of a self-fulﬁlling crisis can arguably be averted by the central bank.
Thecentralbankcanin factstemthe link betweenpublicand privatecreditconditionsthroughinterest
rate cuts or other measures, preventing pessimistic expectations from coming true. In crisis times,
however, monetary policy may become increasingly constrained. If the central bank does not have
sufﬁcient room to manoeuvre, it cannot prevent expectations-driven downturns.
Regarding ﬁscal stabilization policies, we ﬁnd that many of the standard prescriptions of ﬁscal pol-
icy no longer apply in the presence of severe sovereign risk. For instance, with policy rates at the
zero lower bound and a deteriorated ﬁscal outlook, announcing counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy may
be counterproductive, because anticipation of expansionary ﬁscal policy raises the risk of macroe-
conomic instability. Ex ante, desirable effects of stimulus measures are to be weighted against the
possibility of macroeconomic instability – unless the government is able to match the stimulus by
committing immediately and credibly to medium-term consolidation measures, stemming sovereign
risk at its roots. On the other hand, announcing procyclical spending cuts motivated by keeping
sovereign risk under control may not be sufﬁcient to prevent instability. The problem is especially
acute when the recession is expected to be long-lasting.
The analysis of the sovereign risk channel summarized above has so far being carried out in a closed
economy context only. One may expect that a full-ﬂedged open economy version of the same frame-
work implies an even stronger role for ﬁnancial factors driving of cross-border spillovers. For in-
stance, in an open economy, equations (17) and (18) would be augmented by a term capturing the
extent to which sovereign risk premia drive private borrowing costs. While this promising direction
of research is still unexplored, it may nonetheless be useful to discuss some potential implications of
a sovereign risk channel for international policy coordination.
344.2 Sovereign risk and international cooperation
In the context of the ongoing global recession, volatile sovereign risk premia associated with imper-
fect credibility of ﬁscal policies have two relevant implications for international policy coordination.
First, countries currently paying very low rates on their bonds are wary that further stimulus may have
uncertain effects on the economy, as it may turn market sentiments around very quickly. The threat
of rising spreads and hence macroeconomic instability justiﬁes to some extent extremely conserva-
tive ﬁscal attitudes. But this in turn induces contractionary bias in the global economy. Second, all
economies are increasingly likely to be exposed to sizable negative impulses, as market turmoil may
at times force governmentsto resort to emergencyconsolidationmeasuresor, more importantly, result
in negative growth-debt spirals. Through international spillovers, the risks of a global meltdown in
this context are extremely high.
There is large consensus on the need to restore policy credibility in deﬁcit countries as a ﬁrst step
in achieving a sustained global recovery. At the same time, the scope for coordinated ﬁscal expan-
sions by surplus countries is quite limited, because of the considerations above. In the most benign
scenario, deﬁcit countries can rely on moderate stimulus measures abroad, while implementing ﬁscal
retrenchment and debt stabilization policies. Less limited, however,is the scope for coordinated mea-
sures preventing self-fulﬁlling crises. These are likely to include liquidity provision, coupled with
some form of conditionality.
Thereare severalreasonswhy cooperativeagreementson this matter are particularly difﬁcult to reach.
For once, surplus countries may be extremely reluctant to engage on the ground that any help would
do nothing but reduce the incentives for deﬁcit countries to correct their imbalances. A widely held
view in this respect holds that even ﬁnancial assistance purely targeted to stem off a self-fulﬁlling
run easily translates into a net transfer of resources to debtor countries. On the other hand, deﬁcit
countries emphasize that risk premia are strongly correlated across borders. This correlation blurs the
relationship between painful domestic measures to stabilize debt and/or reform the economy and the
market assessment of default risk. As result, it may discourage strong domestic initiatives in deﬁcit
countries.
Neither position has solid theoretical and empirical underpinnings. It stands to reason that, in a deep
crisis, sheltering countries from self-fulﬁlling runs, while at the same time setting clear conditionality
to prevent waste of international resources, would enhance, rather than reduce, the economic and
political gains from budget and economic reforms in the deﬁcit countries (see Corsetti et al. (2006),
Morris and Shin (2006) and Corsetti and Dedola (2011)). By the same token, liquidity assistance is
likely to work only if matched by thorough budget corrections and sensible domestic policies. Both
groups can only gain from reducing the threat to world recovery from widespread market instability
and expectations-driven downturn in the deﬁcit countries.
355 Conclusion
The case for ﬁscal coordination rests on evidence of signiﬁcant cross border macroeconomic effects
of ﬁscal measures. In this paper we have provided novel evidence on this matter, which is broadly
in line with widespread priors among policymakers. Focusing on the US as a base country, our VAR
estimates suggest that unexpected ﬁscal expansions have a large impact on economic activity in the
UK and the euro area. These results are robust to alternative identiﬁcation approaches.
Yet, against the equally widespread view that the transmission operates via a trade (external demand)
channel, we ﬁnd evidence that the transmission operates, instead, via a ﬁnancial channel, which
determines the expenditure/saving allocation. We have shown that a standard international business
cycle model lends support to this interpretation.
We thus provide a new perspective on ﬁscal spillovers which is potentially consequential for policy
coordination. A key role played by the ﬁnancial channel implies that the impact of short-run ﬁscal
measures on current expenditure crucially dependson expectationsof ﬁscal and monetary adjustment
over the medium- and long-run. Long-term bond prices reﬂect these expectations. It follows that
the assessment and design of cooperative policies should not only focus on short-term measures but
need to recognize the importance of providing forward guidance to markets. In fact, coordination on
systematic (policy or budget) rules may be at least as important as coordination of speciﬁc measures
in response to shocks.
In light of these results, in the last part of the paper we have sketched an analysis of international
spillovers and challenges to policy coordination in a context of imperfect credibility. In this context,
high sovereign risk premia put pressure on governments to implement strong budget consolidation
measures. With markets pricing sovereign default, spillover effects on private borrowing costs pro-
foundly alter the transmission mechanism. Not only do they undermine many of the basic prescrip-
tions of stabilization policy derived from the standard model, they also expose the economy to the
risk of downturns driven by self-fulﬁlling expectations. In this context, the case for international
policy cooperation as a necessary step to reduce the risk of a sharp deepening of the ongoing reces-
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